Abstract. This article, the first of a two-part essay, presents an account of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism that engages with recent work on neuroscience and philosophy of mind. I show that Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is compatible with the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology, but that it is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. I begin with the basic claims of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and focus on its understanding of psychological powers embodied in the nervous system. Next, I introduce the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology and illustrate how it can enrich the more abstract ontological framework of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism. In the third section of this article I establish in detail the many ways Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. Based on these fundamental differences I show why a criticism leveled against emergentism by the new mechanist philosophy does not hamper my proposed rapprochement between hylomorphism and the new mechanist philosophy. This conclusion, however, leaves untouched the problem I address in the second article, namely, is the new mechanist philosophy compatible with Aristotelian philosophical anthropology's contention that intellectual operations are immaterial and interact with the psychosomatic operations of the rational animal?
Abbreviations for the works of St. Thomas Aquinas
Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism. This is because, medieval Neo-Aristotelians, like Aquinas, argued that the unique rational and intellectual operations of humans, which evince that they are persons, set them apart from other hylomorphic animals that are constituted from an animating sensory soul that is the substantial form of an organic material body. These intellectual operations transcend the conditions of matter and are grounded in the immaterial rational soul of the human person. The difficulty is that the intellectual nature of the rational soul and its immateriality seem to be incompatible with the ontology of hylomorphic animalism (HMA) and its account of the soul as the substantial form of a material body. Aquinas and other scholastics proposed a variety of unified and eclectic solutions to this tension, and Thomists up to the present continue to defend, develop, and elucidate Aquinas's approach to this problem. For the sake of simplicity,
I call this latter position Thomist hylomorphic personalism (THP).
This essay contributes to these Thomist efforts to resolve certain apparent tensions in THP that concern the interaction of the human person's immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous system. Accordingly, I take for granted a number of contentious philosophical and scientific claims about human persons and their powers that these interaction problems presuppose. This first article sets up the background to the interaction problem for THP; in the second article, I address the problem of noetic and psychosomatic interaction for THP.
This first article commences with the basic claims of Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and its account of embodied psychological powers and operations ( §I). I then illustrate how hylomorphic animalism is enriched by the new mechanist philosophy's approach to biology, neuroscience, and psychology ( §II). The rest of this two-part essay is dedicated to establishing the compatibility of a Thomist hylomorphism with empirical psychology and neuroscience as it is explicated by the new mechanist philosophy (NMP).
One potential barrier is related to the rejection of strong emergentism (SE) by proponents of NMP. In the third section ( §III) of this paper, I address why hylomorphic animalism is not a form of strong emergentism. I then draw attention to the similar reasons given by both HMA and NMP for rejecting SE and the Crypto-Cartesian framework that generates it. But this conclusion introduces a new difficulty, for HMA's and NMP's objections to strong emergence seem to apply no less to THP, which maintains that the intellectual powers of any person are immaterial. I take this challenge seriously. In the second article, I address this challenge and other difficulties with the Thomist account of the interaction of noetic and psychosomatic operations.
Aristotelian Hylomorphic Animalism
Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism is the view that all natural substances, that is, of concrete dynamic individual wholes, are constituted from two fundamental ontological principles: substantial form and matter. Form and matter are not concrete parts that can be recognized through perceptual understanding. What we intelligently perceive are natural substances and their attributes, not their substantial form and matter. Substantial form and matter are known through an intellectual analysis of the natural substances we intelligently perceive; form and matter are the ontological principles that ground and explain the dynamic unity exhibited in composite physical substances. A salient feature of hylomorphism is its contention that form or organization is a fundamental ontological primitive which actualizes and organizes matter; for hylomorphism, there is no actual matter without actual formal organization. The composition of substantial form united to organized matter in every natural substance also grounds each of the substance's organized material attributes. Like the substance itself, the attributes of hylomorphic substances are also composites of form and matter.
These attributes can be comprised of a complex multileveled hierarchy of embodied causal powers that are constituted from organized systems and sub-systems with corresponding activities and subactivities. The causal powers of a physical substance's higher-level attributes are constituted from the actual organization of the material potentialities they organize and integrate into the substance's higher-level systems. Because a substance's higher-level systems are composed from the organized materials of the substance's lower-level systems-such as neurophysiological systems constituted from the organization of more basic organic biochemical systems-the causal powers and activities of higher-level attributes do not violate or compete with, but are enabled by and enlist the activities of the lower-level organic, molecular, atomic, and subatomic systems of the substance. Given the plurality of such causal powers, hylomorphism is committed to a form of property, causal, and explanatory pluralism (Jaworski 2016; Oderberg 2007; Koons 2014; Lonergan 1992; Wallace 1996; Feser 2014 ).
This rough sketch of Aristotelian hylomorphism in general provides the point of departure for hylomorphic animalism, which combines hylomorphism with a version of animalism (Jaworski 2011, chap. 12; Toner 2011; Thornton 2016; Olson Forthcoming I use "enactive" in the technical sense employed by philosophers and scientists influenced by James Gibson's ecological psychology. Alva Noë states that, "According to the enactive approach, perceptual content becomes available to experience when perceivers have practical mastery of the ways sensory stimulation varies as a result of movement." Noë 2004, 199 . The adjective enactive signals the qualification that a certain cognitive operation is inextricably tied to its embodied manifestation and dynamic engagement with objects in the environment. I use "registration" and its cognates in a technical way that captures the wide range of psychological functions Aquinas attributes to the cogitative power in humans and the estimative power in other animals, which intersects nicely with many of the ways that "registration" is used to describe the higher-level psychological abilities of animals by Bermudez 2003; Butterfill and Apperly 2013; De Haan 2014a , 2014b Hutto 2012. 4 Psychological powers intentionalize information in diverse ways. Intentionality denotes the distinctive way that psychological operations enable the animal to cognize about or have cognitive acts that are directed towards their objects. For instance, memories are about the objects I remember and my desire to eat is directed towards food. A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena. (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, 423) Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they exhibit the explanandum phenomenon. (Craver 2007, 6) Let us take note of some obvious points of overlap between hylomorphism and NMP's account of these four elements of mechanisms: phenomenon, component entities, component activities, and organization. 
The Mechanisms of the New Mechanists
A phenomenon is variously described as the behavior or the manifestation of a capacity or power of the mechanism taken as a whole. For instance, the mechanism for protein synthesis synthesizes proteins and the mech- "There are no mechanisms without active organization, and no mechanistic explanation is complete or correct if it does not capture correctly the mechanism's active organization." (Craver 2007, 136) .
Active organization distinguishes mechanisms from mere aggregates (or heaps)
of matter, such as piles of sand. The parts act and interact with one another in such a way that the whole is literally not a mere sum of its parts. Mechanisms are in this sense nonaggregative: the parts of the mechanism are organized in ways that go beyond, e.g., the contribution made by the mass of a grain of sand to the mass of the pile. Mechanisms are not mere sums of properties of their component parts…. (Craver and Darden 2013, 20) Like hylomorphism, NMP maintains that organization is an irreducible ontological and explanatory principle that makes a difference with respect to the causal operations of the component entities it organizes. "Organization is the interlevel relation between a mechanism as a whole and its components. Lower-level components are made up into higher-level components by organizing them spatially, temporally, and actively into something greater than a mere sum of the parts." (Craver 2007, 189 The ubiquity of mechanism dependence is a consequence of the hierarchical organization of mechanical systems and processes, and it explains how productive continuity at lower levels in the mechanistic hierarchy give rise to higher level forms of production. Productive powers of wholes derive from the organization of their parts, and the productive continuity of causal processes derives from productive interactions of parts at various stages in the process. (Glennan 2016, 811) For instance, the mechanisms that underlie the action potential of a neuron are: This is the sort of case for which appeal to top-down causation seems most compelling. However, the case can be described without remainder by appeal only to intra-level causes and to constitutive relations: the 'effect' of the tennis match on glucose metabolism is mediated by a mechanism. In outline: Hal's playing tennis is in part constituted by activities at neuromuscular junctions,
H Y LO M O R P H I C A N I M A L I S M, E M E RG E N T I S M. . .
and activities at those junctions cause, in a perfectly straightforward etiological sense, changes in the organization and behavior of cellular mechanisms. Even if this is made possible by the incorporation of complex interactions, including feedback loops, inside the mechanism, there is nothing mysterious about appealing to a change at a higher level to explain a change at a lower level. Once we have described the mechanism mediating the effect, the drive to speak of this as a case of top-down causation vanishes, although such language might be useful as shorthand. As long as an analysis like that offered above is available, there is nothing problematic in so using it. (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 559-60) Empirical investigations continue to produce more detailed and accurate descriptions and explanations of how these psychological and neurobiological mechanisms and systems are integrated together to constitute the manifestation of the animal's psychosomatic abilities. This empirical task belongs to neuroscience and neuropsychology, not to philosophy. There are, however, a number of philosophical issues to be flagged concerning this proposed union between HMA and NMP. The most significant for our purposes concerns NMP's challenge to strong emergentism (SE). Some proponents of NMP integrate the information processing mechanisms postulated by cognitive science into their accounts of the hierarchy of psychological and neurophysiological mechanisms. It is beyond the aims of this paper to address the (in)compatibility of HMA with the surfeit of idealized models of animal behavior from cognitive psychological and cognitive neuroscience. Nonetheless, a few points of clarification are in order. First, unless stated otherwise, this paper does not employ such terms as "cognitive" "cognition"-as they are employed in cognitive science, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience-to mean computational information processes over causal and/or intentional representations by fully or partially modular "cognitive" components. Rather, I employ "cognition" in much the same way Aquinas uses the term "cognitio," namely, as an analogous term that applies to a range of personal or animal level apprehensive powers and their conscious and intentional operations like vision, tactility, imagination, memory, and understanding. Second, if cognitive science's idealized models are interpreted realistically (and not instrumentally via a Dennett-style intentional stance), then such "cognitive mechanisms" can only be attributed to sub-personal level processes and not to personal level powers and operations for enactive perception or rational and intentional action. I develop this distinction more in the next section. For the relevant debates about cognitive science, see Anderson 2014; Bechtel 2007 Bechtel , 2009 Chemero 2011; Hutto and Myin 2012, 2017; Piccinini and Craver 2011; Ramsey 2007 .
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The New Mechanists and Strong Emergentism
SE is a form of irreducible ontological emergentism that is distinct from the less contentious weak emergentism, which often amounts to a form of epistemological emergence (Bedau and Humphreys 2008 (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 547) .
The shroud of mystery surrounding interlevel causation arises from the assumption that the interlevel relation in such cases is both constitutive and causal at once. On our view, the interlevel relationship is only constitutive. This hybrid framework provides a way to understand most, if not all, the cases for which appeal to top-down causes seems compelling. There may be cases that cannot be handled by this account, but if there are, those who invoke the notion of top-down causation for them owe us an account of just what is involved. … Although our explication of interlevel causation in terms of mechanistically mediated effects renders reference to top-down causation unproblematic, it does not show that the phenomenon is unimportant. The biological world, and much of the world besides, is populated by multilevel mechanisms. Talk of interlevel causation is merely a misleading way to talk about an explanatory interlevel relationship that, upon close inspection, does not involve interlevel causes. (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 562) They conclude with a challenge to SE's claim that neuroscience provides empirical support for their position. In particular, Bechtel and Craver are suspicious of strong emergentists that look to neuroscience for validation of their view that the ontological emergence of mental properties from the complex organized physical properties of the brain is a kind of brute emergence.
[O]ne who insists that there is no explanation for a nonrelational property of the whole in terms of the properties of its component parts-plus-organization advocates a spooky form of emergence. Indeed, levels of mechanisms are levels of ontic mechanistic explanation. Advocates of the spooky emergence of higher--level properties must have in mind a different sense of ''level'' altogether.
Advocates of spooky emergence cannot therefore appeal to levels of mechanisms to make their view seem familiar and unmysterious. (Craver 2007, 217) NMP's challenge to SE says nothing about the independent philosophical Of course, downward causation need not be identified with efficient causation. Many Neo-Aristotelians interpret cases of downward causation in terms of formal causality, which does not require the features presumed by standard accounts of (efficient) causation-e.g., that effects are wholly distinct events from their causes, are contingently and diachronically related-which is what renders interlevel causation problematic for explaining part-whole dependencies identified by NMP. Because contemporary philosophers do not understand emergentism or downward causation in terms of formal causality, I think it is more advisable for Neo-Aristotelians to avoid potential equivocations and resist the temptation to run hylomorphism together with emergentism and downward causation.
Hylomorphic Animalism and Strong Emergentism
and nonreductive physicalism). SE shares with these alternative ontologies of the mind the same Crypto-Cartesian conceptual framework for approaching the mind and psychological attributes. Crypto-Cartesianism denotes a conceptual framework for approaching the mind and body. While Cartesian substance dualism and eliminative materialism defend two radically different ontologies-the former holds the mind is a substance distinct from physical substances, the latter rejects the existence of and theories about mental properties or substances distinct from physical objects-they both share the fundamental assumptions of a Crypto-Cartesian conceptual framework.
Crypto-Cartesianism commences with a mental-physical dichotomy and a number of "intuitive" assumptions about mental and physical properties. Let us focus on the standard SE's accounts of emergent property dualism.
Proponents of SE maintain that the mental properties emerge from organized complex physical systems and only persist if the underlying physical systems maintain their organized complexity. These novel mental properties are produced by-but not realized in-certain structured or organized properties of a physical system. Emergent properties are products distinct from the organized physical properties that produced them. Depending upon whether the proponent of SE is an eliminativist, reductionist, or nonreductionist about diverse physical entities, the physical systems that
produce emergent properties might be animals, but they might also be the brains of animals or, more likely, the fundamental (perhaps subatomic) physical particles in the universe. Hence, SE can endorse a version of animalism, but it need not; indeed, some, if not most, strong emergentists would deny animals have mental properties. HMA can countenance a form of hylomorphic emergence or, more traditionally, eduction, but hylomorphic eductionism is fundamentally different from strong emergentism.
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HMA plays a different philosophical game insofar as it rejects nearly all the starting points and assumptions of Crypto-Cartesian philosophy of mind. 11 Indeed, it is misleading to conceptualize HMA's Neo-Aristotelian 10 See Koons 2014; Oderberg 2007; Stump 2012; Lonergan 1992; Decaen 2000; De Haan Forthcoming; Brower 2014. 11 Most philosophers of mind also take for granted that all commonsense or folk psychological discourse about mental properties-with the possible exception of qualia-is theoretical discourse. According to this widespread view, beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth are unobservable theoretical postulates that provide causal explanations of the observable bare bodily behavior of animals. Neo-Aristotelians reject (1) the theoretical model of mental attributes and folk psychology, (2) the Crypto-Cartesian false dichotomy between empirically observable bodily behavior and unobservable psychological/mental attributes, and (3) the so-called standard theories of mental causation and causal theories human action. See Armstrong and Malcolm 1984; Churchland and Haldane 1988; Hutto 2012; Sellars 1963 . For Neo-Aristotelians, the psychological concepts employed in our everyday commonsense discourse about humans and other animals are pre-theoretical. Furthermore, the observable behavior of animals is often psychological behavior, that is, the overt bodily behavior of animal is constituted from the manifestation of their psychological capacities for seeing, hearing, desiring, registering, and being in pain, and such psychological behavior is just as observable as their tracking, fleeing, hiding, and nursing psychological behavior. Additionally, the very meaning of our ordinary psychological concepts are partially constituted from our understanding of the psychological behavior of animals we perceptually experience. This is why certain patterns of psychological behavior provide the paradigmatic form of criterial evidence for the ascription of psychological attributes, even if this criterial evidence is defeasible in light of countervailing evidence. Finally, Neo-Aristotelian's reject the causal monism and Humean assumptions that underwrite the standard causal theories of the mind and human action. Instead, Neo-Aristotelians embrace causal and explanatory pluralism and do not hold that reasons and psychological causes must be distinct existents that are merely contingently related to their effects. These differences, and many others, explain why Neo-Aristotelians that are true to their first principles adopt radically different positions in the philosophy of intentional action, moral psychology, human agency, and the metaphysics of free will. These complex issues, of course, go beyond the scope of this study. See Bennett and Hacker 2003; Hacker 2008; Ryle 2009; Hyman 2015; Lonergan 1992; Jaworski 2016. views on rational and other animals as a position within philosophy of mind; rather, it is a philosophy of animal psychology (or, These category mistakes violate the homunculus fallacy as well insofar as they posit homunculi that are supposed to perform semi-psychological functions (e.g., proto-seeing or proto-rational decisions) that provide explanations of how the human performs full-blown psychological operations (e.g., seeing or rational decisions). The real difficulty here is with the claim that the mystery of how human thinking occurs is explained by positing homunculi in the brain that exercise proto-thinking. Such explanations merely introduce more mysterious processes to explain the less mysterious ones. It is nearly always problematic to suggest that the operations proprietary to a whole can be explained by postulating that the whole's nonaggregative parts perform the same kind of operation-even in a diminished fashion-that is performed by the whole. As Bechtel points out, this is not the view that NMP endorses.
Typically, though, the operations within a mechanism are different from the phenomenon produced by the mechanism. Within a neuron, for example, neurotransmitters perform such operations as diffusing across a synapse and binding to a receptor; but the neuron itself generates action potentials. The point of organizing component parts and operations into a mechanism is to accomplish something that cannot be performed by the individual components.
Hence, assuming a homunculus with the same capacities as the agent in which it is posited to reside clearly produces no explanatory gain. (Bechtel 2009, 561) The distinction between personal and sub-personal (or animal and sub-animal) levels of description and explanation, as this distinction is employed by John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby, adds another layer of clarity by drawing attention to the specific kinds of wholes and parts at issue here, namely, wholes that are human persons or some other kind of animal (Hornsby 2000; McDowell 1994 Indeed, like HMA, Hornsby endorses this distinction to "recover a non-dualist anti-physicalistic position. It takes personal-level states and powers to be part of our natural endowment as sentient and rational animals." (Hornsby 2000, 23) . Accordingly, this distinction elucidates the diverse but interdependent levels of ontic explanation that allow us to affirm that the hybrid constitutional and causal explanations of sub-personal levels enable the personal-level psychological abilities attributed to the human person, without falling victim to the confusions identified by the homunculus fallacy. Finally, the causal and explanatory pluralism of HMA and NMP not only provide a robust framework for understanding the distinction between personal and sub-personal level attributes, but also illuminate the wide range of sub-personal level attributes that exist-sub-personal level attributes that range from the objects treated in systems neuroscience, to neural assemblies, to individual neural cum glial interactions, to individual synaptic events, inter-/intra-cellular activities and on down to molecular, atomic, and subatomic activities.
Conclusion
What do these complex issues have to Thomist hylomorphic personalism?
The comparisons of HMA, NMP, and SE in the previous sections were neither intended to be defenses nor refutations of any of these complex positions.
My aim was to clarify why the distinct frameworks that drive SE and HMA render these two ontologies fundamentally incompatible, and therefore why NMP's challenge to SE is not directed at HMA, which is compatible with 
